# Faculty & Research
# Working Paper

## When Deviant Leaders are Punished more than Non-leaders: The Role of Deviance Severity

Natalia KARELAIA
Steffen KECK

# When Deviant Leaders are Punished more than Non-leaders: The Role of Deviance Severity

Natalia Karelaia *

Steffen Keck **

Revised version of 2011/12/DS

\*       Assistant Professor of Decision Sciences at INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France. Email: natalia.karelaia@insead.edu
        Corresponding author

\*\*      Postdoctoral Fellow at Carnegie Mellon University 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA. Email: skeck@andrew.cmu.edu

## Abstract

Evaluations of deviant behavior in organizations are often biased by personal characteristics of deviants. In four studies, we investigate the conditions under which sanctioners are more lenient towards deviants who hold leadership positions as compared to individuals at lower levels of organizational hierarchies. Results supported the hypothesized interactive effect of deviance severity—which is defined by the magnitude of harm that deviant behavior inflicts on others—and deviant leadership status on recommended (Studies 1 and 2) and actual punishments (Studies 3 and 4). Leadership status appeared to protect its holders in the case of low-severity deviances, but was a liability in the case of high-severity misbehavior. Furthermore, mediation studies with measured (Study 3) and manipulated (Study 4) proposed mediators supported our hypothesis that perceived entitlement mediates the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment for low-severity deviances. For deviances of high severity, we hypothesized and found that the effect of deviant leadership status is mediated by perceived betrayal of leader-specific responsibilities. These results suggest that deviance severity and perceived rights and responsibilities associated with leadership are important determinants of punitive actions that people are willing to impose on deviant leaders.

Keywords: Deviance; Leader; Punishment; Entitlement; Betrayal; Severity; Harm.

When deviant leaders are punished more than non-leaders: The role of deviance severity

Media across the globe regularly reports cases of misbehavior by business leaders such as Enron's Kenneth Lay, Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski, and WorldCom's Bernard Ebbers. Punishments for business leaders involved in these scandals are often severe. For example, in 2005, former CEO of WorldCom Bernard Ebbers received a 25-year sentence for orchestrating a record $11 billion accounting fraud (Belson, 2005). On the other side, in their daily work leaders are usually given considerable leeway in their behavior. In fact, rule-breaking, aggressive risk-taking, and lack of self-restrain are frequently perceived as marks of good leadership (Kramer, 2003). Prior research has shown that evaluations of deviant behavior are biased by personal characteristics of deviants such as, for example, their social status (Bowles & Gelfand, 2010; Fragale, Rosen, Xu, & Onypchuk, 2009) or group membership (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Understanding such biases is important since they may lead to unfair—either too lenient or too harsh—treatment of deviants. In this paper, we study the effect of deviant leadership status—that is a position which provides its incumbent with both social status and power—on how observers evaluate misbehavior and what sanctions they are willing to impose on the deviant.

Much social-psychological research on power documented a variety of its negative consequences related to the behavior of power incumbents. It has been shown that repeated exercise of power or a mere mental activation of this concept may by itself lead to disinhibited, situationally unconstrained and socially inappropriate behavior, less strict moral behavior, and self-serving performance evaluations (Fiske, 1993; Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Kipnis, 1972; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010). These findings suggest that deviant behavior may abound among high-status power holders.

How do observers react to such behavior? When are people more tolerant of deviances committed by leaders than by non-leaders? When (and why) are they willing to impose a harsher punishment on deviant leaders than non-leaders? Our research seeks to answer these questions.

Power can be thought of as asymmetrical control over resources—both material and social—and other persons' outcomes (Dépret & Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 1993; Keltner et al., 2003). In contrast, social status can be defined as "the outcome of an evaluation of attributes that produces differences in respect and prestige" (Keltner et al., 2003: 266). High social status can be due to both ascribed (e.g., gender, age, family background) and achieved characteristics (e.g., education, competence, skill, occupation). Power and status are closely related and mutually reinforcing (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) because status may determine the allocation of resources within groups (French & Raven, 1959), and individuals derive power from their membership in high social status subgroup (Domhoff, 1998; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). In fact, leadership positions in organizations and social hierarchies give their incumbents both power and high social status, as long as the individuals are perceived as legitimate occupants of these positions (Messé, Kerr, & Sattler, 1992; Keltner et al., 2003). In this research, we focus on the effect of leadership status, and by doing so we thus consider deviants who possess both power and social status.

Drawing on the research on organizational deviance (e.g., Jones, 1991; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Vardi & Weiner, 1996; Warren, 2003), role schema theory (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and, more specifically, leader categorization theory (Lord, 1985; Lord, Foti, & Vader, 1984), we develop and experimentally test the hypothesis that the *severity* of misbehavior—which is defined by the magnitude of harm that deviant behavior inflicts on others—moderates the strength of punishment that observers impose on leaders as compared to non-leaders. We suggest that for deviances of relatively low severity leadership status

protects the actor from harsh evaluations and sanctions. By contrast, when deviances are severe, this effect reverses and being a leader becomes a liability, thereby triggering stronger disapproval and punishment. We propose that this interactive effect of deviant leadership status and the severity of misbehavior is mediated by the extent to which observers perceive the leader to be entitled to certain privileges and to betray expectations that are generally held towards individuals in leadership positions.

We demonstrate the hypothesized interactive effect of deviance severity and deviant leadership status on punishment in scenario-based Studies 1 and 2. We then replicate this result in laboratory experiments and further show that the effect of leadership status on punishment is mediated by perceived entitlement for deviances of low severity and by perceived betrayal of leader-specific expectations for deviances of high severity (Studies 3 and 4).

## Deviant behavior and severity

The term *deviant* is used to denote acts that violate significant norms (Cohen, 1966). In this paper, we define *deviant behavior* as behavior that is voluntary, that violates significant social norms, and in doing so, is potentially harmful to others. Thus, deviant behavior does not live up to the standards set by "hypernorms," or globally held standards of ethical behavior (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Warren, 2003). As such, this definition overlaps with the definition of workplace deviance, which has been conceptualized as behavioral departures from norms of a reference group in general, or, more specifically, significant organizational norms, formal or informal, and threatens the well-being of the organization, its members, or society at large (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The overlap is warranted because organizational norms often (although not always) reflect more general social norms (Warren, 2003). In fact, some scholars explicitly include both "shared organizational norms and expectations" and "core societal values and

standards of proper conduct" to delineate the reference point against which organizational

misbehavior is judged as such (Vardi & Wiener, 1996: 153; see also Vardi & Weitz, 2004).

An important part to all these conceptualizations of deviant behavior is harm that such

behavior inflicts on others. Because deviant acts may harm others, it can be said that they

involve a moral, or ethical, issue (Velasquez & Rostankowski, 1985). Thus, our definition of

deviant behavior is close to what Jones (1991) calls unethical behavior, a category in which

he includes acts that are ethically unacceptable to the larger community.

Importantly, the conceptualization of deviant behavior that we adopt differs from the

legal approach to deviance that considers violations of legal standards (e.g., Baucus &

Baucus, 1997; Miceli & Near, 1984). Deviant behavior, as we define it, may be acceptable or

not from the legal standpoint, but, importantly, it contradicts general social norms. For

example, verbally abusing a co-worker, lying, taking credit for others' work, or unfairly

claiming more resources for the self may be legal or not. However, common to all these

examples is that these behaviors violate significant societal norms and have the potential to

harm others.

Literature on deviant behavior suggests that the magnitude of *harm* inflicted on

victims (individuals or organizations) is a metric on which deviant behavior can be classified

along the *severity* continuum (Jones, 1991; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Umphress &

Bingham, 2011; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). On this metric, deviant acts that are associated with

more serious negative consequence for others are considered more severe and unethical

(Butterfield, Treviño, & Weaver, 2000; Fritzsche, 1988; Jones, 1991; Morris & McDonald,

1995; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; York, 1989), and the perpetrators of acts with more serious

negative consequences tend to be punished more (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; see also Kahneman,

Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998).

We propose that the magnitude of harm caused by a deviant act is a determining factor

of whether deviant leaders are punished for the same misbehavior more than individuals not holding a leadership position. Moreover, deviant behavior of leaders within the context of social structures of organizations is especially interesting, because specific expectations of behaviors associated with leadership roles within such structures can create a reference point for judging leaders' behavior. We suggest that such expectations can lead to differential predictions regarding how harshly leaders and non-leaders are judged for acts that defy societal norms and inflict harm—either mild or substantial—on other individuals within these social structures. We develop these ideas further below.

## Role schema theory

Social cognition research postulates that the role one has in a group activates certain *role schemas* (Fiske, 1993), both in the role holder and observers. Role schemas reflect common descriptive and prescriptive expectations towards a person in this role, and they exert significant influence on processing social information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Among other things, such expectations entail the rights and obligations of the incumbent of a particular social role. The ideas of role schema theory have been widely applied to the field of leadership in the form of *leader categorization theory* (e.g., Lord, 1985; Lord & Emrich, 2001; Lord et al., 1984). According to the leader categorization theory, members of organizations evaluate leaders with respect to the degree to which leaders act according to the common expectations concerning how prototypical leaders should behave and what characteristics they should possess. For example, leaders who are perceived as resembling the "ideal leader" are seen as more intelligent (Epitropaki & Martin, 2005). Importantly, the leader role schema holds that the leader should act in a responsible and fair manner towards the status-conferring group, but also that s/he is entitled to certain privileges (Lord et al., 1984; Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson & Allison, 1994). We suggest that these two sets of expectations affect how observers judge social norm violations—causing either mild or

substantial harm—committed by individuals holding high-status leadership positions in organizations.

### Entitlement

Cognitive role schemas of leadership entail expectations that leaders deserve more privileges than are generally given (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Fiske, 1996; Messé et al., 1992; Samuelson & Allison, 1994). As a consequence of such feelings of *entitlement*, individuals who are assigned to the role of leaders and feel that they legitimately earned the assignment of the role are more likely to violate equality norms and demand higher resources for themselves (De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005).

The feeling of leader entitlement is not limited to individuals in leadership positions but also affects observers. Stouten and Tripp (2009) manipulated deviant leadership status experimentally and found that individuals felt less negative affect towards a group leader who undercontributed to a common goal than towards another undercontributing member of the group who did not hold a leadership position. The more lenient punishment of leaders than non-leaders was mediated by the perceptions that leaders were more entitled to behave selfishly than non-leaders. These findings are in line with the idea that observers may perceive deviant acts committed by individuals in leadership positions to be more normal, widespread, or even normative (Giordano, 1983). Research shows that people see a prototypical leader as more competitive, manipulative, and somewhat less generous than a prototypical non-leader (Lord et al., 1984). As a consequence, observers may see minor misbehaviors as consistent with the leader role schema and thus may be reluctant to sanction harshly deviant leaders.

Drawing on these ideas, we suggest that because of their role-specific privileges, leaders will be given more leeway with respect to less severe violations of social norms that do not cause substantial harm to group members. In contrast, individuals not holding a

leadership position will not be protected by such privileges. As a consequence, low-severity deviances will be punished less when committed by leaders than non-leaders.

However, there should be limits to leader entitlement (Stouten & Tripp, 2009). In fact, the perception of leader entitlement can be a consequence of a commonly held expectation that individual outcomes should be proportional to inputs (Adams, 1965). Since leadership entails greater inputs such as skills, effort, knowledge, and duties (Bass, 1990), leaders should be entitled to special privileges. However, even leaders' inputs are finite. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that when leaders create too much damage relative to their inputs, they are no longer judged as entitled to do so. That is, when deviances are more severe such that they cause significant harm to victims, it is less probable that leaders are seen as entitled to inflict the harm. We propose that not only leaders will not be seen as entitled to cause substantial harm, but also that observers of leaders' deviant behavior will focus more on obligations and responsibilities that are associated with leadership and violated when leaders engage in such severe misbehavior.

### Obligations to the status-conferring group

Expectations associated with leadership roles entail not only privileges, but also duties and obligations. Prototypical leaders are seen as more fair, honest, caring, trustworthy, and unselfish than prototypical non-leaders (Lord et al., 1984) and are expected to act in a responsible and just manner (Samuelson & Messick, 1995). Leaders are also expected to show loyalty to the status-conferring group and contribute to its well-being more than non-leaders (Alvarez, 1968; Giordano, 1983). Social exchange theory supports this idea. It postulates that the relationship between leaders and the members of their organization can be construed as an implicit exchange (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Hollander, 1958; Homans, 1961). Leaders are expected to care for the well-being of their employees and the organization they serve, in exchange for an augmented social status and financial compensation that they

receive (Hollander, 1992; Hollander & Julian, 1969; Messick et al., 1983).

Individuals who fail to fulfill duties specified by their role and behave inconsistently with the prescriptions of the role schemas may incur social penalties (Gouldner, 1960; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; see also Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). Extending this logic, leaders who actively cause substantial harm to the group will be seen as deviating from social expectations regarding the role of leaders. In other words, by violating mutually known expectations, leaders can be seen as *betraying* the group and its members (Giordano, 1983; see also Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Morris & Moberg, 1994), and this is likely to result in strong negative sentiments towards the leaders (Wahrman, 1970). Negative affect in turn is a strong driver of the willingness to punish wrongdoings (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Koehler & Gershoff, 2003). Thus, we argue that when severe deviances—that inflict significant harm on others— are committed by leaders, they are likely to be seen as significant acts of betrayals of leader-specific expectations. In contrast, since individuals not holding leadership positions are perceived to have fewer duties and obligations towards the group than leaders, they are less likely to be seen as betraying others' expectations when engaging in severe misbehavior.

In line with this idea, prior studies have found that leaders who significantly harm their group by being disloyal to the group are evaluated more negatively than non-leaders displaying the same disloyalty (Van Vugt & Chang, 2006). Similarly, Fiddick and Cummins (2007) showed that observers judge high-status actors (e.g., a manager) cheating on a low-status victim (e.g., a subordinate) more harshly than low-status actors cheating on high-status actors in situations where the cheating has substantial financial consequences for the victim. Based on all these arguments, we suggest that if a deviance causes substantial harm to the members of the group, the leader will be perceived as violating the obligations and responsibilities associated with the leadership role and thus punished harsher than a non-leader committing the same transgression.

To summarize, we predict that because people believe that leaders are entitled to certain role-related privileges, deviances of low severity will be punished less when committed by leaders as compared to individuals occupying positions of lower status within organizations. In contrast, deviances of high severity will be judged as betrayal of expectations associated with holders of leadership positions, and therefore leaders will be punished more than non-leaders for committing severe transgressions. Thus, in the case of deviances that cause minor harm to others, being a leader constitutes a protection against punitive actions. When deviances cause major harm to others, leadership status does not protect its holder anymore and becomes instead a liability. Our predictions are summarized in the following hypotheses and in Figure 1:

*Hypothesis 1. Deviance severity moderates the association between deviant leadership status and the extent to which observers punish the deviant, such that for deviant behavior of low severity, leaders are punished more leniently than non-leaders, while for deviances of high severity, leader are punished harsher than non-leaders.*

*Hypothesis 2. For deviances of low severity, perceived entitlement mediates the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment.*

*Hypothesis 3. For deviances of high severity, perceived betrayal of leader-specific expectations mediates the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment.*

------------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
------------------------------------

**Study 1**

The goal of Study 1 was to establish the interactive effect of deviance severity and deviant leadership status on recommended punishment (Hypothesis 1).

**Participants and design**

We recruited 160 adults via an online recruitment tool (Amazon Mechanical Turk[1])
who completed in an online survey for a nominal fee. We employed a 2 (deviant: leader vs.
non-leader) X 2 (deviance severity: high vs. low) between-subject design. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and completed the survey in nine minutes on
average. We included several comprehension questions and two instructional manipulation
checks (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) to identify participants who did not read
questions carefully. As a conservative quality check, the data of the participants who failed to
answer at least one comprehension question or the instructional manipulation check (13%)
were excluded from further analysis. The results below are based on 139 responses (75 men
and 64 women).

**Method**

Participants were asked to assume the role of "HR consultants" and evaluate
employees of a client company. Participants first read a description of a male employee
(adapted from Bowles & Gelfand, 2010). The leader scenario introduced David Rogers, "a
well-regarded senior executive with a long track record of good performance." He was said to
be "the head of the sales department and in charge of over 100 employees"; his high position
in the organizational hierarchy gave him "great authority to make independent decisions."
The non-leader scenario introduced Dave Rogers, "a not well-known staff assistant with little
track record," who "works in the sales department," and "has no formal authority over other
employees." His position in the organization was described as "giving him very little
authority to make independent decisions" and placing him in the lower end of the hierarchy.
Thus, in this study, the manipulation of target leadership status involved elements of both
power and status such as formal authority position, social respect, and proven expertise that

---

[1] Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis (2010) discussed the demographic characteristics of Mechanical Turk (MT)
workers and concluded that the US workers on MT are at least as representative of the US population as
traditional university subject pools. Moreover, they also demonstrated that results obtained in MT do not
substantially differ from results obtained in a lab at a large Midwestern US university.

are typically associated with leadership positions.  In all conditions, the target was male.

After answering questions that tested their understanding of the scenario, participants

rated target *status* by indicating how much status (on a scale from 1 = *very low status* to 7 =

*very high status*) and power (1 = *very little* to 7 = *a lot*) they thought the target had, $\alpha = .96$.

Subsequently, participants were asked to evaluate sequentially four hypothetical deviances

(all of either high or low severity). The deviances were adapted from the list of workplace

deviant behavior that Robinson and Bennett (1995) categorized, by resulting harm, into less

severe ("being late for meetings," "using company stamps to mail personal letters," "making

personal phone calls," and "acting against the decision of a superior") and more severe

("withholding important work-related information," "sexually harassing a co-worker,"

"verbally abusing a co-worker," and "over-reporting travel expenses"). Table 1 provides full

description of the eight deviance scenarios. The order in which the four transgressions were

presented was randomized. For each deviance, participants rated, on a scale anchored at 1(*not*

*at all*) and 10 (*extremely*), how strongly the organization should *punish* the deviant, and this

constituted our dependent variable.

**Results**

**Manipulation check.** As we intended, participants rated the status of the target

character significantly higher in the leader (*M* = 6.43, *SD* = .50) than in the non-leader (*M* =

1.83, *SD* = 1.00) condition, $t(137) = -31.62$,  one-tailed $p < .001$, $d = 5.51$. [2]

**Punishment.** Table 1 displays punishment scores for all deviances. We tested the

significance of the interactive effect of deviant leadership status and deviance severity by

conducting a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) that included deviant

leadership status, severity, and their interaction as between-subject predictors of punishment

---

[2] To test hypotheses with focused directional predictions, statisticians recommend one-tailed contrasts analyses (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Hypotheses, therefore, were analyzed using one-tailed contrasts when appropriate, as noted.

ratings. We used the repeated measures ANOVA because each participant rated four scenarios. The results showed a significant interaction effect of deviant leadership status and severity, $F(1,549) = 34.09$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, supporting Hypothesis 1. Main effect of severity was also significant, $F(1,549) = 164.41$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, while the main effect of deviant leadership status was not, $F(1,549) = 2.46$, $p = .12$. Simple effect analyses testing our specific hypotheses on the direction of the effect of status showed that for deviances of low severity, recommended punishments were lower in the leader condition (averaged across four scenarios of low severity, $M = 4.61$, $SD = 1.82$) than in the non-leader condition ($M = 5.99$, $SD = 1.77$), $F(1,549) = 26.73$, one-tailed $p < .001$, $d = -0.78$. For high-severity deviances, observers recommended stronger punishment for leaders (across four scenarios of low severity, $M = 8.09$, $SD = 1.06$) than non-leaders ($M = 7.30$, $SD = 1.46$), $F(1,549) = 9.36$, one-tailed $p = .001$, $d = 0.62$, as we hypothesized.

------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
------------------------------------

**Discussion**

The results of Study 1 supported our prediction that deviance severity moderates the relationship between deviant leadership status and punishment. Leadership status had a shielding effect for deviances of low severity, but leaders were punished more than non-leaders for deviances of high severity. However, the experimental design had an important limitation: the scenarios in the low- and high-severity conditions were not directly comparable as they involved deviant acts of different nature (e.g., "acting against the decision of a superior" vs. "over-reporting travel expenses"). Moreover, the misbehaviors we used in Study 1 were taken directly from Robinson and Bennett's (1995) classification of workplace deviance into severe and mild. Thus, we did not directly manipulate the magnitude of harm that deviant behavior inflicted on others. We addressed these limitations in Study 2.

**Study 2**

Study 2 was designed to address the limitations of Study 1 by directly manipulating the severity of a specific misbehavior through the magnitude of harm inflicted on victims (Jones, 1991; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Umphress & Bingham, 2011; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). The goal of this study was replicate the moderating effect of deviance severity on the relationship between deviant leadership status and punishment (Hypothesis 1).

**Participants and design**

Two hundred thirteen adults were recruited and remunerated similarly as in Study 1. The experiment was a 2 (deviant: leader vs. non-leader) X 2 (deviance severity: high vs. low) between-subject design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and took an average of five minutes to complete the survey. As in Study 1, we controlled for the quality of responses by including three comprehension questions and an instructional manipulation check. Based on the analysis of participants' answers to these questions, we applied the same conservative elimination rule and excluded the data of the participants who failed to answer at least one of these questions (19%). The results below are based on 173 responses (117 men and 56 women).

**Method**

The general setup and procedure was similar to Study 1 with the exception that each participant evaluated only one deviance: taking credit for others' work. In particular, participants read the following passage (modifications for the non-leader condition appear in brackets):

"One of the teams, which Mr. Rogers has been directly in charge of, [Dave's team] has completed a project that turned out a great success and brought to the company several new clients. The project has been a joint effort of the team of five people, including Mr. Rogers [Dave], and all of them worked hard to make it happen. One of Mr. Rogers' [Dave's] tasks was to write the final report on the project and send it to

the top management. Recently, it has been uncovered that in the final report, Mr.

Rogers [Dave] took all the credit for work done by the team and presented all the

innovative ideas that contributed to the success of the project as his own."

In both high- and low-severity conditions, the benefit to the deviant was kept constant. The

scenarios indicated that

"After he submitted the report, Mr. Rogers [Dave] was congratulated by the top

management of the company and was indeed given an extraordinary bonus of

$10,000."

The severity of the deviance was manipulated by changing the magnitude of harm that the

target inflicted on others. In the low-severity condition, participants read that

"However, none of other team members were rewarded in any way."

In contrast, the high-severity condition read:

"However, the performance of two of the team members was evaluated as inadequate

by the top management, and they were denied all usual annual bonuses."

Both low and high severity conditions contained explicit statements on intentionality of the

target behavior: "It became clear Mr. Rogers [Dave] did this in order to increase his chances

of receiving a performance bonus." Moreover, the scenarios in both conditions also indicated

that Mr. Rogers [Dave] anticipated the possible consequences (i.e., potential harm to others)

of his behavior.

Immediately after reading the description of the target in which we manipulated target

leadership status (and thus before reading the paragraph on misbehavior), participants rated

target *status* by indicating their agreement with the statements that the target had "a high

status within the company" and "a lot of power," $\alpha = .99$. A scale anchored at 1 (*strongly

disagree*) and 7 (*strongly agree*) was used for this and all other measures. As a manipulation

check, we asked participants to indicate how much *harm* they thought the target caused to

others ("caused a lot of harm to other team members," "caused a substantial harm to his team"), $\alpha$ = .77. Finally, to measure *punishment* recommendations, we asked participants to indicate their agreement with three statements on whether the company should take punitive actions against the deviant ("fire Mr. Rogers [Dave]," "take strong formal actions against Mr. Rogers [Dave]," and "punishing Mr. Rogers [Dave] severely"), $\alpha$ = .83.

**Results**

      **Manipulation check.** As expected, participants rated the status of the target character significantly higher in the leader ($M$ = 6.38, $SD$ = .97) than in the non-leader condition ($M$ = 1.72, $SD$ = 1.25), $t(171)$ = -27.61, one-tailed $p$ < .001, $d$ = 4.22. Moreover, a 2 (severity) X 2 (deviant leadership status) between-subject ANOVA of perceived harm showed a significant main effect of severity, $F(1,169)$ = 12.77, $p$ < .001, $\eta_p^2$ = .07. Neither the effect of deviant leadership status nor the status X severity interaction were significant, $F$s <= 1.46, *ns*. Participants ranked the deviance as causing more harm in the high- ($M$ = 6.24, $SD$ = 1.06) than the low-severity ($M$ = 5.61, $SD$ = 1.22) condition, $t(171)$ = -3.57, one-tailed $p$ < .001, $d$ = 0.55, as we intended. Taken together, these results indicate that our manipulation was effective.

      **Punishment.** A 2X2 between-subject ANOVA of punishment recommendations showed a significant main effect of severity, $F(1,169)$ = 8.78, $p$ < .01, $\eta_p^2$ = .05, and a significant leadership status X severity interaction, $F(1,169)$ = 8.55, $p$ < .01, $\eta_p^2$ =.05. The main effect of deviant leadership status was not statistically significant, $F$ < 1. Figure 2 displays the interactive effect of deviant leadership status and deviance severity on punishments. Simple effect analyses revealed that, as in Study 1, in the low-severity condition, punishment recommendations were stronger for Dave Rogers the follower ($M$ = 5.87, $SD$ = 1.01) than for Mr. Rogers the leader ($M$ = 5.23, $SD$ = 1.29), $F(1,169)$ = 7.58, one-tailed $p$ < .01, $d$ = 0.55. In contrast, in the high-severity condition, Mr. Rogers the leader ($M$ =

6.22, $SD = 0.87$) was punished more than Dave Rogers the follower ($M = 5.87$, $SD = 1.17$), although the contrast reached only marginal statistical significance, $F(1,169) = 2.02$, one-tailed $p = .08$, $d = 0.34$.

------------------------------------
Insert Figure 2 about here
------------------------------------

**Discussion**

Study 2 dealt with design limitations of Study 1 by directly manipulating deviance severity through the magnitude of harm inflicted on others and holding all other aspects for the deviant act constant. The results of Study 2 replicated the interactive effect of deviant leadership status and deviance severity on punishment. As in Study 1, leaders were punished less harshly than non-leaders for a deviance resulting in a minor harm. For the same deviant act that caused more significant harm to victims, we found a trend towards punishing more deviant leaders than non-leaders. However, the effect was weak, which could suggest that in this condition, the harm (i.e., a significant pay reduction of several team members) was judged to be so substantial that participants found all deviants deserving a harsh punishment.

In both Studies 1 and 2, participants judged hypothetical misbehavior rather than actual deviances; recommended punishments were purely hypothetical too, without real consequences. We addressed these limitations in Study 3. In addition, we tested the psychological mechanism behind the interactive effect of deviance severity and deviant leadership status on punishment (Hypotheses 2 and 3).

**Study 3**

The goal of Study 3 was to replicate the interactive effect of severity and leadership status (Hypothesis 1) in a laboratory setting in which participants observed misbehavior by others and could impose sanctions which ostensibly had real financial consequences for deviants. We also tested the psychological mechanisms behind this interaction. Specifically, we considered perceived entitlement as a mediator of the shield effect of leadership status for

low-severity misbehavior (Hypothesis 2) and perceived betrayal as a mediator of the liability

effect of status for high-severity misdeeds (Hypothesis 3). A specific misbehavior we chose to

test in this experiment was unfair allocation of resources that results in a high payoff for the

deviant and low payoffs for others. Previous research suggests that when a more fair

allocation can be chosen, *equality* is the distribution heuristic preferred by most decision

makers (Allison & Messick, 1990; De Cremer, 2001; Deutsch, 1975; Harris & Joyce, 1980).

Moreover, the decision was presented to participants in the context of a modified trust game

(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995), in which an unfair allocation of resources is in addition a

betrayal of commonly held expectations of trustworthiness (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004;

Keck & Karelaia, 2012), and such expectations are stronger for leaders than non-leaders (Lord

et al., 1984).

Thus, our operationalization of deviance in this study combines the elements that have

been emphasized by the literature on organizational deviance, such as self-interest and

damages to others (e.g., Jones, 1991; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990; Vardi & Wiener, 1996)

and in that resembles the scenario used in Study 2. As in Study 2, we manipulated deviance

severity through the magnitude of harm inflicted on victims (e.g., Robinson & Bennett, 1995;

Vardi & Wiener, 1996).

**Participants and design**

Research assistants recruited 163 participants (72 men and 91 women, aged 18 to 35

years; $M_{age}$ = 23 years) at a major university in Paris. The vast majority of participants (93%)

were undergraduate students. Participants were said that they had the opportunity to earn

between €2 and €10; in fact, their payoff was fixed at €7. The experiment was a 2 (deviant:

leader vs. non-leader) X 2 (deviance severity: high vs. low) between-subject design.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and completed the

experiment in approximately 35 minutes. The experiment was fully computer-mediated.

Participants were told that they would interact with three other participants who were supposed to work with each other in a team. In fact, the behavior of all team members was pre-programmed and all participants completed the study individually (for a similar procedure, see De Cremer & van Knippenberg, 2002, 2004).

**Method**

Participants were assigned to isolated individual cubicles equipped with a computer. All instructions were provided on the computer screens. The experiment was programmed in *z-tree* software (Fischbacher, 1999). Participants were informed that they were part of a group of four who were going to complete the experiment together. They were told that one person would be randomly selected for the role of "team observer," while the other three would form a team to perform further tasks together. Unbeknown to them, all participants were assigned to the "team observer" role. They were told that their task would be to observe the team and then evaluate the team members. Participants were informed that they would receive a fixed compensation of €7 as observers, whereas the compensation of the three team members would depend on their performance in subsequent tasks.

In the leader condition, all three team members ostensibly completed a leadership test that was supposed to assess their leadership skills. After that, participants were given "feedback" on the team members' leadership scores. They were informed that the team member with the highest score was assigned to the role of "team leader," and the other two members to the role of "workers." In the non-leader condition, participants were told instead that for the next five minutes the team members would be getting familiar with the software required for their teamwork. In the leader condition, the team members were referred to as Worker 1, Worker 2, and Team Leader for the rest of the study, whereas in the non-leader condition team members were referred to as Team Members 1, 2, and 3. After this role manipulation, participants answered a few comprehension questions concerning the

assignment of roles within the group (see De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005; Stouten & Tripp, 2009, for a similar procedure). As a manipulation check, participants in the leader condition were asked which player was assigned to the role of team leader. All participants remembered it correctly.

To strengthen the leader manipulation, participants were informed next that the team would complete the "Lost at Sea Survival" task (Nemiroff & Pasmore, 1975). In this task, each team member supposedly had to rank five items according to their importance for survival on a life raft drifting in the ocean. In the leader condition, Team Leader ostensibly received the rankings from Worker 1 and Worker 2 and made a final decision that would count as the team's solution to this task. In the non-leader conditions, the team's solution was said to be automatically computed as the average of the three individual rankings. After a brief waiting period, participants received feedback about the team performance that in all conditions was described as excellent.

Participants were then informed that the team was going to perform another task that would determine final compensation for each team member. The task was a modified trust game (Berg et al., 1995) in which each team member had to make one decision as depicted in Figure 2. This type of game has been successfully used in previous research on reactions to social norm violations (e.g., Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Haselhuhn, Schweitzer, & Wood, 2010; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Players in this game made their decisions sequentially. First, Worker 1 (Team Member 1) had to decide either to end the game—and thereby ensure a payoff of €4 for everyone—or to continue. If Team Member 1 (Worker 1) decided to continue, Worker 2 (Team Member 2) faced the same decision. If both team members decided to continue, Team Leader (Team Member 3) had to make a decision that would determine financial payoffs for all three players. S/he could choose between: (a) an equal allocation: €5 for everyone; (b) an allocation improving his/her own financial payoff

and somewhat harming the other two players: €6 for Team Leader (Team Member 3) and €3.50 for other two team members; and (c) a highly unfair allocation which increased his/her financial payoff but severely harmed the interests of the other two players: €8 for Team Leader (Team Member 3) and €0.20 for other two team members. In all conditions, participants were informed that Workers 1 and 2 (Team Members 1 and 2) had chosen to continue the game. In the low-severity conditions, participants were told that Team Leader (Team Member 3) had chosen the mildly severe alternative (b). In the high-severity condition, Team Leader (Team Member 3) was said to have chosen alternative (c) that seriously damaged the payoff of others.

Thus, the final decision maker in the team had the possibility to choose a fair allocation of resources and by not doing so violated the equality norm of distributive fairness (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1990; De Cremer, 2001; Deutsch, 1975) and the expectations of trustworthiness (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Keck & Karelaia, 2012). Thus, while the choice of an unfair alternative was within the rule of the game, it represents a violation of social norms and expectations, which makes it suitable to draw conclusions on deviant behavior, as we define it.

------------------------------------
Insert Figure 3 about here
------------------------------------

Participants were next informed about the team members' decisions and then given a possibility to allocate "*misbehavior points*" to the team members. Each misbehavior point would lower the final payoff of that team member by 10 cents. Final payoffs could not be lower than zero. The number of points allocated to the target person (Team Leader or Team Member 3) was our dependent variable that measured the extent to which participants punished the target person for his or her decision. To measure *perceived betrayal*, we asked participants to evaluate the extent to which they considered the deviant behavior as a betrayal

of the team on a four-item scale (i.e., "Team Leader betrayed the team," "Team Leader let the team down," "Team Leader disappointed the team," and "Team Leader was disloyal to the team," $\alpha = .92$) anchored at 1 (*completely disagree*) and 7 (*completely agree*). *Perceived entitlement* was measured as the extent to which participants agreed with three statements suggesting that the target person was entitled to his/her behavior (i.e., "Team Leader deserves to receive a payoff of €6 [€8]," "It was OK for Team Leader to claim a payoff of €6 [€8] for himself/herself," and "The decision of Team Leader was appropriate in this situation," scale from 1 = *completely disagree* to 7 = *completely agree*, $\alpha = .84$).

Previous research has shown that sense of power may affect attitudes towards unethical behavior (e.g., Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010) and interact with deviant leadership status (Bowles & Gelfand, 2010). To rule out the possibility that participants evaluating leaders felt more powerful than participants evaluating non-leaders, we thus assessed participants *sense of power* on a four-item scale adapted from Anderson and Galinsky (2006) (e.g., "In my relationships with others I can get people to listen to what I say," scale from 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *very much*, $\alpha = .70$). Finally, participants provided demographic information, were debriefed and dismissed.

**Results**

**Manipulation check.** We verified whether participants' sense of power was similar in the conditions in which they evaluated the behavior of the team leader and in which they assessed a team member's behavior. The results of a 2 (severity) X 2 (deviant leadership status) between-subject ANOVA revealed that the main effect of deviant leadership status was not significant, $F(1,159) < 1$. The effect of severity and the interaction were not significant either, $Fs < 1$. Thus, the extent to which participants felt powerful was similar in the leader ($M = 4.41$, $SD = 0.91$) and non-leader ($M = 4.91$, $SD = 0.82$) conditions, $t(161) = .27$, *ns*. These results indicate that our manipulation of deviant leadership status did not affect

participants' sense of power.

**Punishment.** To test our prediction that deviance severity interacts with deviant leadership status when predicting punitive actions (i.e., misbehavior points allocated to deviants), we conducted a 2 (severity) X 2 (deviant leadership status) between-subject ANOVA with the number of misbehavior points that participants allocated to the deviant as the dependent variable and severity, deviant leadership status, and their interaction as predictors. The results showed a significant main effect of severity, $F(1,159) = 27.69$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .14$. The main effect of deviant leadership status was non-significant, $F < 1$. In line with Hypothesis 1, we found a significant interaction between severity and deviant leadership status, $F(1,159) = 8.51$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$. Figure 4 is a graph of this interaction.

To test our specific directional hypothesis regarding the effect of status on punishment, we conducted simple effect analyses. These analyses showed that for deviances of high severity, leaders ($M = 43.51$, $SD = 21.34$) were punished harsher than non-leaders ($M = 31.27$, $SD = 29.52$), $F(1,159) = 6.57$, one-tailed $p < .01$, $d = 0.48$, as we predicted. For deviances of low severity, leaders ($M = 15.96$, $SD = 15.00$) were punished less harshly than non-leaders ($M = 23.38$, $SD = 17.42$), as predicted, although the effect was only marginally significant, $F(1,159) = 2.43$, one-tailed $p = .06$, $d = -0.46$.

-------------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 4 about here
-------------------------------------------------

**Mediation analyses.** We hypothesized that the effect of deviant leadership status was mediated through either perceived entitlement or betrayal—depending on deviance severity. To test this hypothesis, we conducted *moderated mediation* (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) analyses that are appropriate for models where the strength of mediation (i.e., by entitlement and betrayal in our case) is conditional on some moderators (i.e., deviance severity in our case) (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). Using the procedures recommended by Preacher et

al. (2007) and Edwards and Lambert (2007), we first conducted regression analyses to test whether the indirect effects of deviant leadership status on punishment through perceived entitlement and betrayal were significant and then applied a bootstrapping technique (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) to understand whether these indirect effects were moderated by deviance severity.

Table 2 shows the results of the regression analyses according to the dependent variable of interest.  Step 1 was a regression model predicting punishment (i.e., the dependent variable) from deviant leadership status (i.e., the independent variable), severity (i.e., the moderator), and their interaction. At Step 2, we regressed perceived entitlement (i.e., the first mediator) on deviant leadership status (i.e., the independent variable), severity (i.e., the moderator), and their interaction. Step 3 was an analogous model predicting perceived betrayal (i.e., the second mediator). Finally, at Step 4 we regressed punishment (i.e., the dependent variable) on deviant leadership status (i.e., the independent variable), severity (i.e., the moderator), their interaction, and perceived entitlement and betrayal (i.e., the two mediators).

These results revealed that the deviant leadership status X severity interaction significantly predicted perceived entitlement (Step 2: $\beta = -.32$, $p < .05$) and betrayal  (Step 3: $\beta = .41$, $p < .001$), and that perceived entitlement and betrayal significantly predicted punishment (Step 4: $\beta = -.33$ and .39, correspondingly, both $p < .001$). Moreover, the deviant leadership status X severity interaction became non-significant ($\beta = .09$, $p = .39$) when the mediators were added to the model predicting punishment (i.e., Step 4 compared to Step 1). These results suggest that perceived betrayal and entitlement mediated the relationship between the deviant leadership status X severity interaction and punishment.

To better understand this complex relationship and to test whether the mediation was conditional on deviance severity, we next assessed the size of the indirect effects of the

deviant leadership status X severity interaction on punishment through perceived betrayal and entitlement. We used bootstrap procedures to construct bias-corrected confidence intervals (CI) based on 5,000 random samples with replacement from the full sample (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). This method has been shown to produce reliable results in multiple-mediator models (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). We specifically hypothesized that perceived entitlement mediates the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment for low-severity misbehavior, while for high-severity deviant acts, the effect is mediated by perceived betrayal. In the high-severity condition, the bootstrapping results of the 95% bias-corrected CIs for indirect effects of deviant leadership status showed a significant ($p = .04$) positive indirect effect through betrayal (1.46; 12.28), but a non-significant indirect through entitlement ($p = .74$, CI = [-3.38; 6.35]), as we predicted. In the low-severity condition, the indirect effect of status through perceived entitlement was significant ($p = .02$; CI: [-6.28; -1.05]), in line with our prediction. However, the indirect effect through perceived betrayal was also marginally significant ($p = .06$; CI: [-9.92; -.60]). These results overall support our moderated mediation hypothesis by showing that the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment is mediated by perceived betrayal for deviances of high severity and mainly by perceived entitlement for deviances of low severity.

-------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------------------------

**Discussion**

The experimental results of Study 3 showed that stronger punishment of deviant leaders than non-leaders committing a major deviance and thus causing considerable harm to team members was mediated by the extent to which observers perceived misbehavior to constitute a betrayal of team expectations. In contrast, for minor deviances resulting in less significant harm to others, the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment was mainly mediated by perceived entitlement of the deviant to the behavior in question. Unexpectedly,

our results showed that in the low-severity condition, there was a marginally significant indirect effect of deviant leadership status through perceived betrayal too. Leaders were considered not only more entitled in this condition, but also less betraying than non-leaders. Given that we measured perceived entitlement and betrayal one after another, it might be that the two measures "contaminated" each other and produced a halo effect. To address this limitation and to further test the conditional mediation effects, we conducted another study, in which we directly manipulated the proposed mediators, i.e., perceived entitlement for deviances of low severity and perceived betrayal for high-severity deviances. Finally, while our manipulation of severity through the magnitude of harm to others was straightforward in Study 3, we did not test whether participants indeed thought that the severe deviance resulted in a more significant harm than the deviance that we intended to be seen as mild. We thus pre-tested the experimental manipulation in Study 4.

**Study 4**

The goal of Study 4 was to provide additional evidence that the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment is mediated by perceived entitlement when the deviant engages in transgressions of low severity and that perceived betrayal mediates the effect of deviant leadership status when deviances are seen as resulting in major harms to others. With this objective, we conducted a laboratory experiment, similar to Study 3, where we directly manipulated the hypothesized mediators, following the recommendations by Bullock, Green, and Ha (2010). Our reasoning was that if for low-severity transgressions the effect of deviant leadership status operates through perceived entitlement, manipulating entitlement to be perceived as low should eliminate the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment. Similarly, if for high-severity transgressions the effect of status is mediated by perceived betrayal of leader-specific expectations, then manipulating betrayal to be perceived as low in a given situation should eliminate the effect of deviant leadership status.

Previous research has shown that attributions of perpetrator intentionality in part determine retributive reactions (Miller, 2001). Moreover, observers tend to attribute greater intentionality to the actions of high-status deviants than deviants of low status and this, in part, explains why high-status deviants are punished harsher (Fragale et al., 2009). Thus, in Study 4, we also measured and controlled in our analyses for perceived intentionality.

**Participants and design**

Two hundred sixty-nine participants (170 women and 99 men, aged 18 to 38 years; $M_{age} = 22.51$ years) were recruited and remunerated similarly as in Study 3. The experiment had a 2 (deviant: leader vs. non-leader) X 2 (deviance severity: high vs. low) X 2 (manipulated mediator vs. control) between-subject design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. As Study 3, this experiment was fully computer-mediated.

**Method**

The procedure and the main task were the same as in Study 3, except that the payoffs and the composition of the group were modified as explained below. Participants were said that ostensibly three other participants were assigned to the roles of team leader and workers, and that participants themselves were assigned to the role of observers. While in Study 3 in the non-leader condition all three team members were of equal status, in this experiment, the composition of the team was kept constant in all experimental conditions (i.e., two workers and one leader). Only deviant leadership status (leader vs. non-leader) was varied between conditions. This design allowed us to better isolate the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment. As in Study 3, first two players presumably had to make their choice between ending the game (that would result in this experiment in a payoff of €5 for the decision maker and €1 for two other players) and passing decision to the next player. Participants were informed that both players chose to pass. Last decision maker (leader in the leader condition

and a worker in the non-leader condition) had a choice between the outcome that would give €5.5 to each of the three players and an unequal outcome where the decision maker him/herself would get €7, while the payoff of two other players would fall below €5.5, down to €4.8 in the low-severity condition and €0.5 in the high-severity condition. The last decision maker, participants were said, chose the unequal alternative. After observing these decisions, participants were given a possibility to punish the wrongdoer by subtracting "*misbehavior points*" from his/her payoff, and this measure constituted our dependent variable. Thus, as in Study 3, the wrongdoing to be evaluated by participants was a violation of the equality norm of distributive fairness.

Status of the wrongdoer was manipulated as in Study 3. As in Study 3, after leader/non-leader role manipulation (and before describing the wrongdoing), we checked whether participants correctly understood role assignment. All participants in the leader condition answered correctly which player was assigned to the role of team leader. As described above and similar to Study 3, severity was manipulated by varying the magnitude of harm that the wrongdoer's action inflicted on other team members' well-being. In addition, we controlled for the benefit that the wrongdoer was getting for him/herself. As indicated above, the amount that the wrongdoer presumably received him/herself as a consequence of his/her choice was kept fixed at €7 in all conditions.

The proposed mediators were manipulated in the following way. In the low-severity condition, our goal was to reduce the perception that team leader was more entitled to certain privileges than other team members. With this objective, when informing participants of who was assigned to which role within the team, we added the following paragraph:

"Note that these roles only determine the particular tasks the group members are going to perform. They do not entail any other rights or privileges."

In the high-severity condition, our objective was to reduce the perception that team leader had

additional responsibilities than any other team member. We thus added the following

paragraph:

> "Note that these roles only determine the particular tasks the group members are going
>
> to perform. They do not entail any other responsibilities or obligations."

As a manipulation check, we assessed the extent to which participants thought the deviant (1)

*betrayed* team expectations ("violated his/her responsibilities towards the team"), and (2) was

*entitled* to do what s/he did ("it was legitimate for him/her to chose that alternative," for a

similar measure, see De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2005), on a scale anchored at 1 (*completely*

*disagree*) and 7 (*completely agree*). Finally, to measure *perceived intentionality*, we asked

participants to indicate the extent to which they thought the wrongdoer's choice was

intentional, on a scale from 1 (*very unlikely*) to 7 (*very likely*).

**Results**

    **Manipulation checks.**

    *Severity.* We conducted a pre-test of our severity manipulation in a separate online

study. Fifty-two participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and were randomly

assigned to either low- or high-severity condition. They read a detailed description of the trust

game, with the harm to others varying by condition. The game was described in the same way

as it was in the main study. The instructions made no references to leadership status

differences between the three players and referred to all of them as team members.

Participants indicated to what extent they agreed that by choosing the unequal alternative, the

last decision maker caused "a lot of" and "a very substantial" harm to two other players, $\alpha =$

.79. The scale was anchored at 1 (*strongly disagree*) and 7 (*strongly agree*). Confirming the

suitability of our manipulation, participants rated the behavior of the decision maker as

causing significantly more harm in the high-severity condition ($M = 4.94$, $SD = 1.40$) than in

the low-severity condition ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.56$), $t(50) = 3.02$, one-tailed $p < .01$, $d = 0.85$.

*Entitlement and betrayal.* We analyzed whether our manipulations of proposed mediators were successful. Bullock et al. (2010) emphasize that experimental interventions aimed to affect the hypothesized mediator should affect only the mediator in question and no other potential mediator. We thus also analyzed whether our manipulations of entitlement inadvertently affected the difference in perceived betrayal between leaders and non-leaders, and whether our manipulations of betrayal inadvertently affected the difference in perceived entitlement of leaders and non-leaders. We first run a 2 (deviance severity) X 2 (deviant leadership status) X 2 (manipulated mediators vs. control) ANOVA with entitlement as dependent variable and then analyzed simple effects of deviant leadership status. These analyses revealed that leaders ($M = 4.58$, $SD = 2.19$) were considered to be significantly more entitled than non-leaders ($M = 3.44$, $SD = 1.89$) to engage in deviances of low severity in the control condition, $F(1,261) = 5.18$, one-tailed $p = .01$, $d = .57$, but not in the condition in which we manipulated perceptions of entitlement to be low ($M = 3.58$, $SD = 2.17$ and $M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.89$, respectively), $F < 1$. Moreover, there was no significant difference between perceived entitlement of leaders and non-leaders in the high-severity condition when we manipulated the proposed mechanism for that condition (i.e., betrayal), $F < 1$.

We obtained a similar result for perceptions of betrayal. In particular, for high-severity deviances, leaders ($M = 5.94$, $SD = 1.09$) were considered to be violating their responsibilities towards the group significantly more than non-leaders ($M = 5.09$, $SD = 2.14$) in the control condition, $F(1,261) = 3.42$, one-tailed $p = .03$, $d = .52$, but not in the condition in which we manipulated perceptions of betrayal to be low ($M = 5.41$, $SD = 1.86$ and $M = 5.20$, $SD = 2.00$, respectively), $F < 1$. Furthermore, in the low-severity condition, in which we manipulated perceived entitlement, there was no significant difference between perceived betrayal by leaders and non-leaders, $F < 1$. These results indicate that the manipulation of mediators worked as intended.

*Intentionality.* We conducted similar analyses to verify that our manipulation of perceived entitlement and betrayal did not inadvertently affect perceived intentionality, another potential mediator. Our results showed that intentionality perceptions indeed were not affected by the manipulation of our proposed mediators. All simple effects of the manipulation (for all four combinations of deviant leadership status and severity) were not significant, $F$s$(1,261) < 1$.

**Punishment.** A 2 (deviance severity) X 2 (deviant leadership status) X 2 (manipulated mediators vs. control) ANOVA of punishment with perceived intentionality as a covariate revealed a significant three-way interaction between severity, deviant leadership status, and the betrayal/entitlement manipulation, $F(1,260) = 8.04$, $p < .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$. There was also a significant main effect of deviance severity, $F(1,260) = 29.11$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .10$, but no main effect of leadership status, $F < 1$. None of the two-way interactions was significant, all $F$s $< = 1.23$. The main effect of perceived intentionality was significant, $F(1,260) = 6.50$, $p = .01$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. To understand better the three-way interaction between severity, deviant leadership status, and the betrayal/entitlement manipulation, we conducted follow-up planned contrast analyses, which indicated that the three-way interaction was due to the presence of a significant severity X deviant leadership status interaction in the control conditions, $F(1,260) = 7.66$, $p < .01$, but not in the conditions in which mediators were manipulated, $F(1,260) = 1.54$, *ns*, supporting our predictions.

-----------------------------------------------
Insert Figure 5 about here
-----------------------------------------------

We specifically predicted that leaders and non-leaders would receive differential punishment in the control conditions, but not in the conditions in which we manipulated the proposed mediators. We conducted further planned contrast analyses to elucidate the effect of manipulating the mediators. The results revealed that, as Figure 5 shows, for deviances of low

severity, leaders ($M = 15.94$, $SD = 24.53$) were punished less than non-leaders ($M = 27.44$, $SD = 28.02$) in the control condition, $F(1,260) = 4.15$, one-tailed $p = .02$, $d = -0.44$, but not in the condition in which we manipulated the entitlement associated with the leadership role to be low ($M = 26.21$, $SD = 24.20$ and $M = 20.28$, $SD = 15.50$, respectively), $F(1,260) = 1.12$, *ns*. This result supports our hypothesis that perceived entitlement is a mechanism through which deviant leadership status affects punishment for low-severity deviances. For deviances of high severity, leaders ($M = 45.31$, $SD = 22.21$) were punished more than non-leaders (M = 33.85, $SD = 18.29$) in the control condition, $F(1,260) = 3.52$, one-tailed $p = .03$, $d = 0.57$, but not in the condition in which we manipulated the degree of responsibilities associated with the leadership role to be low ($M = 34.27$, $SD = 25.54$ and $M = 36.15$, $SD = 24.80$, respectively), $F < 1$. Thus, our hypothesis that perceived betrayal of leader-specific responsibilities mediates the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment for high-severity deviances was also supported.

**Discussion**

The results of Study 4 supported our conditional mediation hypotheses. We found that leaders received more lenient punishments than non-leaders for low-severity deviances, but only when the perception of leader-specific entitlement was not experimentally manipulated to be low. Similarly, leaders were punished harsher than non-leaders for high-severity deviances, but the difference disappeared when we manipulated the betrayal of leader-specific responsibilities to be perceived as low. These results suggest that perceived entitlement mediates the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment for mild misdeeds (Hypothesis 2) and that perceived betrayal mediates the effect of leadership status on punishment for major deviances (Hypothesis 3).

**General discussion**

Corporate and political scandals with leaders abusing of their positions to benefit

themselves at the expense of others and more generally violating significant social norms and thereby causing harm to others are abound in the press. While deviant leaders sometimes receive harsh sanctions for their misbehavior, they often appear to be immune to punishment. One may begin to question: Does leadership status protect its holders or is it a liability for deviants?

We presented the results of four experiments designed to understand when observers punish deviant leaders more than non-leaders and what explains these effects. We proposed that deviance severity—which we defined, drawing on previous research (Jones, 1991; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Umphress & Bingham, 2011; Vardi & Weiner, 1996), as the magnitude of harm that deviant behavior inflicts on others—largely determines whether leadership status is a shield or a liability. Across the four studies, the results showed that observers tend to punish leaders less than non-leaders for mild acts of deviance, but impose harsher sanctions on leaders than non-leaders when they engage in severe misbehavior that causes substantial harm to others. As for the mechanism that explains this shield/liability effect of status, we proposed and found that in the case of low-severity deviances, the perception that leaders are *entitled* to certain privileges mediates the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment. In contrast, severe deviances shift the attention of observers to leader-specific responsibilities. Perceived *betrayal*, or violation, of expectations regarding how a leader should behave (i.e., being fair, trustworthy, caring, unselfish, etc., Lord et al., 1984) explains why leaders are punished harsher than non-leaders for high-severity deviances.

Our findings make important contributions to the literatures on deviant behavior and leadership. By highlighting the joint effect of deviant leadership status and deviance severity, this research allows to bridge two contradictory streams of literature. On the one hand, literature suggests that for the same transgression, leaders and in general actors of a relatively higher status are evaluated more leniently than low-status actors (Bowles & Gelfand, 2010;

Schur, 1983; Stouten & Tripp, 2009; Thomson & Zingraff, 1981). On the other hand, other studies have reported instead that high-status deviants are judged harsher (e.g., Fragale et al., 2009). Our findings suggest that deviance severity should be taken into account when predicting the effect of deviant leadership status on punishments imposed on the deviant. For example, while previous research has showed that deviants holding a position superior than the victim of the wrongdoing are considered more responsible and evaluated harsher (Hamilton & Saunders, 1981), our results suggest that this is likely to be so only when the harm resulting from the wrongdoing is major, as we found in Studies 3 and 4, in which victims were holding lower positions than the deviant.

This research also advances our knowledge about the mechanisms underlying the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment. First, we showed that perceived entitlement explains a greater leniency towards leaders (Stouten & Tripp, 2009), but only when deviances are mild. Second, leadership theories suggest that to be perceived as legitimate and effective, leaders have to fulfill the expectations of their followers (Gouldner, 1960; Hollander, 1992; Hollander & Julian, 1969; Lord, 1985). Our results contribute to the leadership literature by suggesting that followers may perceive a highly severe violation of social norms committed by a leader as a strong betrayal of their expectations and as a result punish them more. It thus may be problematic for the leader to maintain the ability to influence followers after committing a severe deviant act.

This study is subject to several limitations that suggest directions for future research. First, this research focused only on how *observers* react to deviances committed by leaders. Simultaneously, we defined and manipulated deviance severity through harm that the deviant act inflicted on victims. It remains unclear whether our results also apply to *victims* themselves, as opposed to third-party observers. It could be illuminating to examine whether victims are more willing to retaliate severe transgressions when these are committed by

leaders, and mild transgressions when these are committed by non-leaders.

Second, further studies can directly address the question how *followers* react to deviances committed by leaders and whether they are willing to continue endorsing deviant leaders. From the symbolic interactionism perspective (Blumer, 1969; Goffman, 1959), which emphasizes the importance of social interactions for the development of identity and meaning in general, an individual only becomes a leader when followers accept him/her as such and "grant" this identity to the leader (DeRue & Ashford, 2010; DeRue, Ashford, & Cotton, 2009). When a leader violates significant social norms and in doing so causes harm to others, s/he may reduce the chances that followers reciprocate his/her claims for a leader identity. While our results suggest that it might be easier for deviant leaders to continue being endorsed by followers when deviances are mild than severe, further laboratory and field studies should explore whether mild deviant behavior may even be *expected* from leaders, given that leadership positions are seen as providing their incumbents with additional privileges. If this is the case, committing a minor transgression may have null effect for leaders' reputation, or, ironically, even reinforce the recognition by others of their "leader qualities." Future studies exploring these issues might provide further insights on the role of deviance severity and leader-specific expectations in predicting the consequences of deviant behavior for leaders.

Third, while we hypothesized and generally found that for high-severity deviances leaders were punished more than non-leaders, there might be a ceiling effect whereby for outrageous deviances causing extreme harm to victims leaders and non-leaders are similarly harshly punished. In our Study 2, leaders were punished only slightly more than non-leaders for a deviance of high severity (i.e., harm consisting in a significant pay reduction of several team members). The fact that the difference was only marginally significant may suggest that participants saw the harm as extremely severe. Future studies should further examine the

boundary conditions for the effects that we documented and in particular test whether the status effect on punishment disappears for transgressions resulting in harms universally judged as extreme (e.g., causing a human death).

Fourth, the generalizability of our results to different cultures may be limited. As our results show, where we draw the line between what is punishable and what is not, depends not only on whether a leader engages in a severe or a mild deviant behavior, but also on whether the leader is seen as entitled to certain privileges and as having specific responsibilities associated with his/her position. Cross-cultural research suggests, however, that *implicit leadership theories*—that is, cognitive categories used to distinguish leaders from non-leaders (Lord et al., 1984)—may vary from culture to culture (Lord & Maher, 1991). Our results are based on the data collected in France and USA, where, as House et al. (1999) suggest, people tend to "glorify" the concept of leadership. Further research should explore whether these results also hold in cultures where leader role schemas emphasize, for example, humbleness and modesty, or where egalitarianism places a special role, or yet where leaders are expected to be self-centered. Provided how widespread deviant behavior among leaders is, future research on these issues seems warranted.

Finally, we believe that this research has important practical implications. Deviant and in general unethical behavior in organizations causes a lot of material loss and psychological distress. One way to diminish deviant behavior would be to impose formal sanctions on deviants. Another mechanism would involve social disapproval and condemnation of acts that violate societal rules (Grasmick & Green, 1980). Our results imply that the extent to which anticipated social disapproval alone might prevent potential deviants from engaging in questionable behavior depends on deviance severity and deviant leadership status. We found that observers tend to downplay deviances that result only in minor harm to others when these are committed by leaders. It implies that ex-post social disapproval alone may not be

sufficient to reduce the instances of minor deviances committed by leaders. Other

mechanisms such as, for example, holding leaders accountable (De Cremer, 2003; Tetlock,

1992) should thus be considered in order to prevent leaders from setting "bad precedents."

# References

Adams, S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 267−299). New York: Academic Press.

Allison, S. T., & Messick, D. M. (1990). Social decision heuristics in the use of shared resources. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, *3*, 195–204.

Alvarez, R. (1968). Informal reactions to deviance in simulated work organizations: A laboratory experiment. *American Sociological Review*, *33*, 895–912.

Anderson, C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2006). Power, optimism, and risk-taking. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *36*, 511–536.

Bass, B. M. (1990). *Bass and Stogdill's handbook of leadership: Theory, research, and managerial applications* (3rd ed.). NY: Free Press.

Baucus, M. S.,  & Baucus, D. A. (1997).  Paying the piper: An empirical examination of longer-tem financial consequences of illegal corporate behavior. *Academy of Management Journal*, *40*, 129–151.

Belson, K. (2005). WorldCom chief is given 25 years for huge fraud. *The New York Times*, July 14. Retrieved on November 21, 2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/business/14ebbers.html?pagewanted=all.

Bennett, R. J., & Robinson, S. L. (2000). Development of a measure of workplace deviance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *85*(*3*), 349–360.

Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995) Trust, reciprocity, and social history. *Games and Economic Behavior*, *10*, 122–142.

Bies, R. J., & Tripp, T. M. (1996). Beyond distrust: "Getting even" and the need for revenge. In Kramer, R. & Tyler, T. (Eds.), *Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research* (pp. 246–260). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Blau, P. M. (1964). *Exchange and power in social life.* New York, NY: Wiley.

Blumer, H. (1969). *Symbolic interactionism: Perspectives and method*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Bohnet, I., & Zeckhauser, R. (2004). Trust, risk and betrayal. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *55*, 467–485.

Bowles, H. R., & Gelfand, M. (2010). Status and the evaluation of workplace deviance. *Psychological Science*, *21*(*1*), 49-54.

Bullock, J. G., Green, D. P., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Yes, but what's the mechanism? (don't expect an easy answer). *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*(*4*), 550–558.

Butterfield, K. D., Treviño, L. K., & Weaver, G. R. (2000). Moral awareness in business organizations: Influences of issue-related and social context factors. *Human Relations, 53*(*7*), 981–1018.

Charness, G., Cobo-Reyes, R., & Jiménez, N. (2008). An investment game with third-party intervention. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *68*(*1*), 18–28.

Cohen, A. K. (1966). *Deviance and control*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

De Cremer, D. (2001). Effects of roles and performance feedback on the equality rule in resource-sharing tasks. *Journal of Social Psychology*, *141*, 153−155.

De Cremer, D. (2003). How self-conception may lead to inequality: Effects of hierarchical roles on the equality-rule in organizational resource-sharing tasks. *Group and Organization Management*, *28*, 282−302.

De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2005). When and why leaders put themselves first? Leader behavior in resource allocations as a function of feeling entitled. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *35*, 553−563.

De Cremer, D., & van Knippenberg, D. (2002). How do leaders promote cooperation? The effects of charisma and procedural fairness. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *87*, 858–

866.

De Cremer, D., & van Knippenberg, D. (2004). Leader self-sacrifice and leadership

effectiveness: The moderating role of leader self-confidence. *Organizational Behavior*

*and Human Decision Processes*, *95*, 140–155.

Dépret, E., & Fiske, S. T. (1993). Social cognition and power: Some cognitive consequences

of social structure as a source of control deprivation. In G. Weary, F. Gleicher, K.

Marsh (Eds.), *Control motivation and social cognition* (pp. 176–202). NY: Springer-

Verlag.

DeRue, D. S., & Ashford, S. J. (2010). Who will lead and who will follow? A social process

of leadership identity construction in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*,

*35*, 627–647.

DeRue, D. S., Ashford, S. J., & Cotton, N. C. (2009). Assuming the mantle: Unpacking the

process by which individuals internalize a leader identity. In L. M. Roberts & J. E.

Dutton (Eds.), *Exploring positive identities and organizations: Building a theoretical*

*and research foundation* (pp. 217–236). New York: Routledge.

Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which value will be used as

the basis of distributive justice? *Journal of Social Issues*, *31*, 137−149.

Domhoff, G. W. (1998). *Who rules America*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing.

Donaldson T., & Dunfee T. W. (1994). Toward a unified conception of business ethics:

Integrative social contracts theory, *Academy of Management Review*, *19*, 252–284.

Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S.  (2007).  Methods for integrating moderation and mediation:

A general analytical framework using moderated path analysis.  *Psychological*

*Methods*, *12*, 1–22.

Elangovan, A. R., & Shapiro, D. L. (1998). Betrayal of trust in organizations. *The Academy of*

*Management Review*, *23*, 547–566.

Emerson, R. M. (1976). Social exchange theory. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *2*, 335–362.

Epitropaki, O., & Martin, R. (2005). From ideal to real: a longitudinal study of the role of implicit leadership theories on leader member exchanges and employee outcomes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *90*, 659–676.

Fiddick, L., & Cummins, D. (2007). Are perceptions of fairness relationship-specific? The case of noblesse oblige. *The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *60*, 16–31.

Fischbacher, U. (1999). Ztree: A toolbox for readymade economic experiments. Working Paper, Institute For Empirical Research In Economics, University of Zurich.

Fiske, S. T. (1993). Social cognition and social perception. In M. R. Rosenzweig, & L. W. Porter (Eds.), *Annual Review of Psychology* (Vol. 44, pp. 155–194). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews Inc.

Fiske, S. T. (1996). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. *American Psychologist*, *48*, 621–628.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). *Social cognition* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw Hill.

Fragale, A. R., Rosen, B., Xu, C., & Onypchuk, I. (2009). The higher they are, the harder they fall: The effects of wrongdoer status on observer punishment recommendations and intentionality attributions. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *108*, 53–65.

French, J., & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power (pp. 150–167). Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.

Fritzsche, D. J. (1988). An examination of marketing ethics: Role of the decision maker, consequences of the decision, management position, and sex of the respondent. *Journal of Macromarketing*, *8*(*2*), 29–39.

Georgesen, J. C, & Harris, M. J. (1998). Why's my boss always holding me down? A meta-

analysis of power effects on performance evaluations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *2*, 184–195.

Giordano, P. C. (1983). Sanctioning the high-status deviant: An attributional analysis. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 46*, 329–342.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. *American Sociological Review*, *25*(*2*), 161–178.

Grasmick, H. G., & Green, D. E. (1980). Legal punishment, social disapproval and internalization as inhibitors of illegal behavior. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, *71*, 325–335.

Hamilton, V. L., & Sanders, J. (1981). The effect of roles and deeds on responsibility judgments: The normative structure of wrongdoing. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *4*, 237–254.

Harris, R. J., & Joyce, M. A. (1980). What's fair? It depends on how you phrase the question. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 165−179.

Haselhuhn, M., Schweitzer, M. & Wood, A. (2010). How implicit beliefs influence trust recovery. *Psychological Science*, *21*(*5*), 645–648.

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes*. London: Routledge.

Hollander, E. P. (1958). Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit. *Psychological Review, 65*, 117–127.

Hollander, E. P. (1992). Leadership, followership, self, and others. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *3*(*1*), 43–54.

Hollander, E. P., & Julian, J. W. (1969). Contemporary trends in the analysis of leadership processes, *Psychological Bulletin*, *71*(*5*), 387–397.

Homans, G. C. (1961). *Social behavior: Its elementary forms.* NY: Harcourt Brace and

    World.

House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Ruiz-Quintanilla, S. A., Dorfman, P. W., Javidan, M., Dickson,

    M., Gupta, V., et al. (1999). Cultural influences on leadership and organizations:

    Project GLOBE. In Mobley, W. H., Gessner, M. J., & Arnold,V. (Eds.), Advances in

    global leadership (Vol. 1, pp. 171–233). Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-

    contingent model. *Academy of Management Review*, *16*, 366–395.

Jones, W., & Burdette, M. P. (1994). Betrayal in relationships. In Weber, A. & Harvey, J.

    (Eds.), *Perspectives on close relationships* (pp. 243–262). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Kahneman, D., Schkade, D., & Sunstein, C. R. (1998). Shared outrage and erratic awards:

    The psychology of punitive damages. *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, *16*, 49–86.

Keck, S., & Karelaia, N. (2012). Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament

    incentives. *Experimental Economics*, *15*(*1*), 204−228.

Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H, & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition.

    *Psychological Review*, *110*, 265–284.

Kerr, N. L., Hymes, R. W., Anderson, A. B., & Weathers, J. E. (1995). Defendant-juror

    similarity and mock juror judgments. *Law and Human Behavior*, *19*, 545–567.

Kipnis, D. (1972). Does power corrupt? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *24*,

    33–41.

Koehler, J. J., & Gershoff, A. D. (2003). Betrayal aversion: When agents of protection

    become agents of harm. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *90*,

    224–226.

Kramer, R. M. (2003). The harder they fall. *Harvard Business Review*, *81*, 58–66.

Lammers, J., Stapel, D. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). Power increases hypocrisy: Moralizing

in reasoning, immorality in behavior. *Psychological Science*, *21*, 737–744.

Lord, R. G. (1985). An information processing approach to social perceptions, leadership

perceptions and behavioral measurement in organizational settings. In B. M. Staw &

L. L. Cummings (Eds.), *Research in organizational behavior* (Vol. 7, pp. 85–128).

Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Lord, R. G., & Emrich, C. (2001). Thinking outside the box by looking inside the box:

Extending the cognitive revolution of leadership research. *Leadership Quarterly*, *11*,

551–579.

Lord, R. G., Foti, R. J., & de Vader, C. L. (1984). A test of leadership categorization theory:

Internal structure, information processing, and leadership perceptions.

*Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *34*, 343–378.

Lord, R., & Maher, K. J. (1991). *Leadership and information processing: Linking perceptions

and performance*. Boston: Unwin-Everyman.

Magee, J. C., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Social hierarchy: The self-reinforcing nature of

power and status. *Academy of Management Annals*, *2*, 351–398.

Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Leyens, J-P. (1988). The "black sheep" effect: Extremity

of judgments towards in-group members as a function of group identification.

*European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*, 1–16.

Messé, L. A., Kerr, N. L., & Sattler, D. N. (1992). "But some animals are more equal than

others": The supervisor as a privileged status in group contexts. In S.Worchel,

W.Wood, & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), *Group processes and productivity* (pp. 203–222).

Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Messick, D. M., Wilke, H., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P. E., & Lui, L. (1983).

Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas. *Journal

of Personality and Social Psychology*, *44*, 294–309.

Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1984). The relationships among beliefs, organizational positions and whistle-blowing status: A discriminant analysis. *Academy of Management Journal*, *27*, 687–705.

Miller, D. T. (2001). Disrespect and the experience of injustice. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *52*, 527–553.

Morris, J. H., & Moberg, D. J. (1994). Work organizations as contexts for trust and betrayal. In Sarbin, T., Carney, R., & Eoyang, C. (Eds.), *Citizen espionage: Studies in trust and betrayal* (pp. 163–187). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Morris, S. A., & McDonald, R. A. (1995). The role of moral intensity in moral judgments: An empirical investigation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *14*(*9*), 715–726.

Morrison, E. W., & Robinson, S. L. (1997). When employees feel betrayed: A model of how psychological contract violation develops. *Academy of Management Review*, *22*, 226–256.

Muller, D., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2005). When moderation is mediated and mediation is moderated. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *89*, 852–863.

Nemiroff, P. M.,  & Pasmore, W. A. (1975). *Lost at sea: A consensus-seeking task. The annual handbook for group facilitators*. University Associates, La Jolla.

Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *45*(*4*), 867–872.

Paolacci, G., Chandle J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. *Judgment and Decision Making*, *5*(*5*), 411–419.

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior Research Methods*, *40*, 879–891.

Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, *42*, 185–227.

Robinson, S. L., & Bennett, R. J. (1995). A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: A multidimensional scaling study. *Academy of Management Journal*, *38*, 555–572.

Rosenthal, R., Rosnow, R. L., & Rubin, D. B. (2000). *Contrasts and effect sizes in behavioral research: A correlational approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rudman, L. A., & Fairchild, K. (2004). Reactions to counterstereotypic behavior: The role of backlash in cultural stereotype maintenance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *87*, 157–176.

Samuelson, C. D., & Allison, S. T. (1994). Cognitive factors affecting the use of social decision heuristics in resource-sharing tasks. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *58*, 1–27.

Samuelson, C. D., & Messick, D. M. (1995). When do people want to change the rules for allocating shared resources? In D. Schroeder (Ed.), *Social dilemmas* (pp. 143−162). New York: Praeger.

Schur, E. M. (1983). *Labeling women deviant: Gender, stigma, and social control*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Schweitzer, M., Hershey, J., & Bradlow, E. (2006). Promises and lies: Restoring violated trust. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *101*, 1–19.

Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and non-experimental studies: New procedures and recommendations. *Psychological Methods*, *7*, 422–445.

Stouten, J., & Tripp, T. M. (2009). Claiming more than equality: Should leaders ask for forgiveness? *The Leadership Quarterly*, *20*, 287–298.

Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). *Using multivariate statistics* (5th ed.). Boston, MA:

Allyn and Bacon.

Tetlock, P. E. (1992). The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a social contingency model. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *25*, 331–376.

Thomson, R. J., & Zingraff, M. T. (1981). Detecting sentence disparity: Some problems and evidence. *American Journal of Sociology*, *86*, 869–880.

Treviño, L. K., & Youngblood, S. A. (1990). Bad apples in bad barrels: A causal analysis of ethical decision-making behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *75*, 378–385.

Umphress, E. E., & Bingham, J. B. (2011). When organizational citizens do bad things for good reasons: Examining unethical pro-organizational behaviors. *Organization Science*, *22*, 621–640.

Van Vugt, M., & Chang, K. (2006). Group reactions to loyal and disloyal high status members.  Unpublished manuscript.

Vardi, Y., & Wiener, Y. (1996). Misbehavior in organizations: A motivational framework. *Organizational Science*, *7*(*2*), 151–165.

Vardi, Y., & Weitz, E. (2004). *Misbehavior in organizations: Theory, research and management*. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.

Velasquez, M. G., & Rostankowski, C. (1985). *Ethics: Theory and practice*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

York, K. M. (1989). Defining sexual harassment in workplaces: A policy-capturing approach. *Academy of Management Journal*, *32*, 830–850.

Warren, D. E. (2003). Constructive and destructive deviance in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, *28*, 622–632.

**Table 1**

**Mean Punishment Ratings (Study 1)**

| Deviance | Deviant | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | **Leader** | **Non-leader** | **Mean** |
| **Low Severity** | | | |
| 1. Mr. Rogers (Dave) was repeatedly late for meetings. | 3.96 | 5.95 | **5.16** |
| 2. Mr. Rogers (Dave) mailed personal letters using company stamps. | 5.04 | 6.02 | **5.63** |
| 3. Mr. Rogers (Dave) made personal phone calls and wrote personal e-mails during his working hours. | 3.15 | 4.32 | **3.85** |
| 4. Mr. Rogers (Dave) acted against the decision of a superior. | 6.30 | 7.68 | **7.13** |
| **Mean** | **4.61** | **5.99** | **5.44** |
| **High Severity** | | | |
| 1. Mr. Rogers (Dave) withheld important work-related information from other employees and superiors. | 7.21 | 5.40 | **6.14** |
| 2. Mr. Rogers (Dave) sexually harassed a co-worker. | 9.48 | 8.83 | **9.10** |
| 3. Mr. Rogers (Dave) verbally abused a co-worker. | 7.76 | 7.43 | **7.56** |
| 4. Mr. Rogers (Dave) over-reported his travel expenses in order to receive a higher reimbursement. | 7.93 | 7.52 | **7.69** |
| **Mean** | **8.09** | **7.30** | **7.62** |

Note: N = 139.

**Table 2**
**Regression Analyses Predicting Punishment and Hypothesized Mediators (Study 3)**

|  | Step 1 DV = punishment | Step 2 DV = perceived entitlement | Step 3 DV = perceived betrayal | Step 4 DV = punishment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deviant leadership status | -0.16 (-1.56) | 0.34 (3.35)*** | -0.23 (-2.49)* | -0.04 (.50) |
| Severe deviance | 0.17 -1.66 | -0.19 (-1.90) | 0.28 (3.11)** | -0.01 (-0.09) |
| Deviant leadership status X Severe deviance | 0.36 (2.92)** | -0.32 (-2.60)* | · 0.41 (3.60)*** | 0.09 (0.87) |
| Perceived entitlement | | | | -0.33 (-4.70)*** |
| Perceived betrayal | | | | 0.39 (5.13)*** |
| adj. $R^2$ | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.42 |
| F | F(3, 159) = 12.22 | F(3, 159) = 25.76 | F(3, 159) = 12.92 | F(3, 159) = 12.92 |
| Comparison to Step 1: $\Delta R^2$ | | | | .25*** |

Notes: N = 163. Standardized beta coefficients; *t*-statistics in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$.

**Figure 1**

**Conditional mediation model of the effect of deviant leadership status on punishment**

<u>**A: Deviances of low severity**</u>

Perceived entitlement

Deviant
leadership status

+

-

-

Punishment

<u>**B: Deviances of high severity**</u>

Deviant
leadership status

+

Punishment

+

+

Perceived betrayal

**Figure 2**

**Mean Punishment Recommendations (Study 2)**



Note: N = 173.

**Figure 3**

**Design of Trust Game (Study 3)**

**Figure 4**

**Mean Punishment (Number of "Misbehavior Points") (Study 3)**



Note: N = 163.

**Figure 5**

**Mean Punishment (Number of "Misbehavior Points") (Study 4)**



Note: N = 269.

Europe Campus
Boulevard de Constance
77305 Fontainebleau Cedex, France
Tel: +33 (0)1 60 72 40 00
Fax: +33 (0)1 60 74 55 00/01

Asia Campus
1 Ayer Rajah Avenue, Singapore 138676
Tel: +65 67 99 53 88
Fax: +65 67 99 53 99

Abu Dhabi Campus
Muroor Road - Street No 4
P.O. Box 48049
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Tel: +971 2 651 5200
Fax: +971 2 443 9461

www.insead.edu

## INSEAD

**The Business School
for the World®**